Prop. 36 Will:

  • ELIMINATE unintended and ineffective life sentences currently imposed for nonviolent, non-serious crimes
  • RESTORE the original intent and core purpose of the Three Strikes law: to keep dangerous and violent criminals behind bars.
  • SAVE $100 million per year to fund schools, prevent crime, and decrease the need for tax increases.

For Relief Under Prop. 36:

We are working closely with Public Defender offices and other service providers throughout the state to provide the best possible assistance for anyone eligible for relief under Prop. 36.

Click here for resources.

Why We Won

Proposition 36 and California’s corrections budget

California’s Three Strikes law did more than lengthen sentences: it placed people convicted of nonviolent offences in prison for decades. Proposition 36 draws a sharper distinction between dangerous repeat offending and less serious crime. The impact of Proposition 36 on the California Department of Corrections’ budget turns on a straightforward but frequently overlooked point: public savings arise only when sentencing changes lead to fewer people in custody, or to people leaving custody sooner.

For readers in Australia, that distinction offers a useful policy lesson. Sentencing and prison budgets belong to state and territory governments here, not to a single national corrections department. NSW, Victoria, Queensland and other jurisdictions operate their own prisons, parole systems and community correction services, so a California saving would not directly reduce an Australian tax bill. It does, however, provide a clear case study in how sentencing reform, prison population policy and public money intersect.

What Proposition 36 would change

Proposition 36, approved by California voters in 2012, changed the treatment of some people serving life sentences for a third felony. A person convicted of a third nonviolent felony, with no previous conviction for a serious or violent felony, became eligible to seek resentencing rather than remain imprisoned indefinitely under the old rule. Serious and violent offenders remained subject to the most severe penalties.

The change did not create automatic release. Eligible people still had to pass through a review process, and the resentencing framework included a minimum period of 25 years in custody. Its financial importance comes from the number of people who complete that process and can be released with supervision, rather than remaining in prison for the rest of their lives.

That human-scale effect is visible in the campaign’s inmate profiles, which illustrate the consequences of very long sentences. These personal stories explain the policy stakes, but they cannot replace official eligibility figures when assessing how much Proposition 36 might save.

Resentencing and the prison population

CDCR’s budget is shaped by the number of people held in state prisons and on parole. Each additional year of custody carries costs for accommodation, food, medical care, security, education and eventually release services. Reducing the length of a qualifying sentence therefore affects future expenditure as well as the number of prison places required.

Contemporary state estimates projected roughly US$400 million in savings over the first four years after implementation. That figure depended on several assumptions: how many prisoners qualified, how quickly their cases were reviewed, and how many were actually granted resentencing. It represented a forecast rather than money sitting in a separate account waiting to be spent.

The consequences extend beyond the prison walls. A longer sentence can reduce family income, increase caregiving demands and make employment and housing harder after release. This families’ generational perspective shows how one prolonged sentence can affect children, partners and older relatives across more than one generation.

Why projected savings need scrutiny

Population projections are the most uncertain part of the fiscal calculation. Proposition 36 addressed prisoners already serving life sentences, but future costs also depend on new admissions, sentence lengths set in county courts, parole revocations and changes in crime patterns. A projected saving based on resentencing can be weakened if declining release rates elsewhere increase the broader prison population.

Some costs also move rather than disappear. If someone leaves state prison earlier but receives intensive parole supervision, treatment or emergency housing, the Department of Corrections may spend less while another agency incurs additional expenditure. Counting only the prison portion can therefore exaggerate the overall public benefit.

Budget presentation matters as well. California’s Legislature and Department of Finance determine how savings are used; CDCR does not control a corrections budget independently of the wider state fiscal system. Lower projected expenditure may prevent future spending increases, but it does not necessarily produce an equivalent immediate cash reduction. A credible assessment must distinguish gross prison costs, administrative expenses and costs shifted to other public bodies.

Turning fiscal savings into public value

The strongest budget argument is not that reform solves every fiscal problem in California. It is that the state can reduce expensive custody without weakening its response to serious violence. If the savings are deliberately reinvested, they can address conditions linked to offending and improve the experience of people returning to the community.

A practical reinvestment package could include the following:

  • Expanding parole preparation and supervision for people leaving prison after resentencing.
  • Funding mental-health and substance-use treatment during custody and reentry.
  • Supporting crime prevention and services for victims in the communities affected.
  • Helping county sheriffs and local organisations coordinate housing and employment after release.
  • Maintaining education, healthcare and security for prisoners who remain in custody.

Such choices require scrutiny rather than automatic acceptance. Those who work in law enforcement can test the operational claims in the campaign’s law enforcement endorsements. Their experience is relevant because unsafe release decisions could create costs elsewhere, including additional victim harm and pressure on supervision services.

Reinvestment also has to account for what happens after release. People leaving prison without housing, income or treatment may struggle to comply with parole conditions, and a return to custody would undo some of the original saving. Supervision capacity and community support are therefore part of the fiscal calculation, not optional additions to it.

What Australian budgets can teach

Australia’s system offers a useful comparison because each state or territory administers its own corrections system. In NSW, prison and parole decisions involve Corrective Services NSW and facilities such as the Silverwater Correctional Complex in western Sydney. In Victoria, responsibility rests with the Department of Justice and Community Safety and corrections services operating prisons such as Parkville. State treasuries then weigh these costs against schools, hospitals, transport and infrastructure in annual budget decisions.

Australian debates about corrections often use blunt, practical language: “law and order”, “prison costs” and “cost blowout”. That vocabulary captures the fiscal reality even when it simplifies the causes of offending. A prison budget is not isolated from the rest of the public purse. Money released from a prison population can support treatment, housing and prevention, but it can also be absorbed into a larger departmental allocation without producing a visible community benefit.

The human context differs as well, but not completely. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are disproportionately represented in Australian prisons, while California communities also experience stark racial and economic disparities within the corrections system. In both settings, decisions about prison space and release support affect families who have little control over the sentence imposed. Comparing the two countries should therefore include community outcomes, not merely expenditure figures.

Questions taxpayers should ask

Evaluating Proposition 36 requires more than a headline estimate. The number of eligible prisoners, the pace of review and the actual change in prison population matter more than a total produced before implementation. Financial claims should also be tested against the cost of administering resentencing and supporting people after release.

A transparent fiscal assessment would examine the following:

  • How many people have been legally eligible for resentencing, and how many have completed reviews?
  • How many prison places and occupied bed-days have actually been avoided?
  • What costs have shifted to parole agencies, counties, housing services or health programmes?
  • Are the savings reducing future expenditure, funding new services or entering general revenue?
  • What do release outcomes and return-to-custody figures show about public safety?

The answers should be reported consistently. Counting only successful resentencings can overstate savings if releases are later reversed, while counting every projected candidate can underestimate the programme if reviews are slow. A prison-population series, combined with a full accounting of related costs, provides a more reliable basis for judgement than a single budget number.

For an Australian audience, this checklist also prevents false equivalence. California cannot spend an Australian state’s savings, and no local prison population changes automatically when a proposition is approved in another country. The transferable lesson concerns budget method: measure the people no longer held in custody, identify costs that continue after release and make the destination of any saving clear.

A practical measure of reform

Proposition 36’s financial case is strongest when treated as a managed reduction in unnecessary custody, not as a money-making scheme. Its fiscal benefit depends on identifying eligible people, completing reviews, releasing them safely and measuring what happens to both prison costs and public safety. The reform does not need every saving reinvested in a new programme if the money genuinely lowers future expenditure, but the destination should be transparent.

The same standard applies when California voters consider other sentencing changes and when Australian governments review their own corrections budgets. Fewer people in prison can create real capacity, while stronger rehabilitation and supervision can reduce the likelihood of costly reoffending. The public benefit appears when both effects occur together rather than being counted separately.

The practical takeaway is that Proposition 36 works as fiscal policy only when avoided incarceration is measurable, related costs are included and the savings become visible benefits to the community rather than disappearing into a larger budget line.

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