Prop. 36 Will:
- ELIMINATE unintended and ineffective life sentences currently imposed for nonviolent, non-serious crimes
- RESTORE the original intent and core purpose of the Three Strikes law: to keep dangerous and violent criminals behind bars.
- SAVE $100 million per year to fund schools, prevent crime, and decrease the need for tax increases.
For Relief Under Prop. 36:
We are working closely with Public Defender offices and other service providers throughout the state to provide the best possible assistance for anyone eligible for relief under Prop. 36.
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Why We Won
Three Strikes Reform And California’s Recidivism Strategy
California’s Three Strikes law was created to impose severe consequences on repeat offenders, especially people with serious or violent criminal histories. Its broad reach, however, meant that some people received life sentences after a third conviction that was neither serious nor violent. That design raised a central policy question: does a sentence that keeps a person in prison for life reduce future crime in every case, or can a more targeted approach protect the public more effectively?
Recidivism reduction efforts focus on preventing a person released from custody from committing another offense. Those efforts may include substance-use treatment, mental-health care, education, job training, housing assistance, structured supervision, and behavioral programs. Sentencing policy affects how much California can invest in these interventions, because prison capacity, corrections spending, and the age and risk profile of the incarcerated population all influence the resources available for reentry.
The connection between Three Strikes and recidivism policy is therefore larger than the question of sentence length. It involves how the state identifies dangerous conduct, distinguishes risk from criminal history alone, and uses limited public-safety resources. Proposition 36, the 2012 reform measure, moved California toward a system that preserved harsh penalties for dangerous offenders while creating pathways for relief in qualifying nonviolent cases.
Why repeat-offender policy matters for public safety
A prior conviction can provide important information about a person’s history, but it does not automatically show the same level of current risk in every case. People who commit violent assaults, use weapons, exploit vulnerable victims, or repeatedly engage in dangerous conduct present a different public-safety concern from people whose third strike involved a lower-level, nonviolent offense.
Three Strikes treated the accumulation of qualifying convictions as a powerful reason for a life sentence. That approach reflected a belief that repeated offending demonstrated a settled threat requiring permanent incapacitation. Incapacitation can prevent crimes by keeping an individual confined, yet it does not address the reasons many people return to crime after release, such as addiction, untreated trauma, unstable housing, unemployment, or association with criminal networks.
Recidivism reduction policies take a longer view. They ask which interventions can reduce future offending during incarceration and after release. A person assessed as low or moderate risk may benefit from cognitive behavioral therapy, vocational services, and close but proportionate supervision. A person with a serious violent record may require a different combination of secure confinement, intensive treatment, and carefully controlled reentry.
How the original Three Strikes model shaped corrections
California’s original law imposed a sentence of 25 years to life for a third felony conviction when the person had two prior serious or violent felony convictions. In practice, the law became a defining feature of the state’s prison system and contributed to long sentences for some people whose latest offense did not involve violence.
The structure produced a strong incapacitation effect for those who remained imprisoned. At the same time, it reduced the opportunity to test whether a particular individual could safely complete treatment, supervision, or other evidence-based programming in the community. A life sentence may eliminate the immediate risk posed by release, but it also limits the state’s ability to use graduated sanctions and incentives that are common in reentry planning.
Age further complicates the relationship between sentence length and public safety. Many people desist from crime as they grow older, while the health and financial costs of imprisonment generally increase with age. Keeping every qualifying person incarcerated for life may produce diminishing public-safety returns when compared with targeted supervision and services for those who can be safely released.
What Proposition 36 changed
Proposition 36 amended the Three Strikes law by generally reserving a life sentence for a third conviction that is serious or violent, subject to important exceptions. It also created a resentencing process for some people serving life terms based on a third offense that was neither serious nor violent. Courts must review the person’s criminal history, the current offense, and statutory exclusions before granting relief.
The reform did not erase Three Strikes or eliminate enhanced punishment for dangerous conduct. People with certain prior convictions, including specified sex offenses or offenses involving firearms and other serious factors, may remain ineligible. A court may also deny resentencing when the person poses an unreasonable risk of committing a new serious or violent felony.
The legal details matter because the reform depends on precise classifications. California’s definitions of serious and violent felonies determine who receives a life sentence, who can seek resentencing, and what evidence a court considers. A clear explanation of the violent felony standard helps show why the same criminal history can produce different outcomes under the amended law.
| Policy question | Broad Three Strikes approach | Reform-oriented approach |
|---|---|---|
| Primary focus | Criminal history and sentence severity | Current offense, prior history, and assessed risk |
| Third-offense treatment | Life sentence could follow a nonviolent third felony | Life sentence generally reserved for a serious or violent third felony |
| Public-safety tool | Long-term incapacitation | Incapacitation for high-risk people plus targeted intervention |
| Reentry opportunity | Limited for people serving life terms | Possible resentencing and supervised reintegration for eligible people |
| Resource use | Greater long-term prison costs | Potential savings for treatment, supervision, and prevention |
| Judicial role | Apply broad statutory sentencing rules | Review eligibility, exclusions, and unreasonable-risk evidence |
Matching sanctions to measurable risk
A recidivism reduction strategy works best when it separates offense severity from individual risk. An offense-based rule describes what happened. A risk assessment attempts to estimate the likelihood of future offending by examining factors such as age, criminal history, substance use, employment, education, peer networks, and prior response to supervision.
Risk assessment is not a substitute for judicial judgment, and it must be applied carefully. Tools can contain racial or socioeconomic bias if they rely on data shaped by unequal policing or access to legal representation. They should support transparent decisions rather than create an automatic path to either release or continued imprisonment.
Proposition 36’s framework supports a more individualized conversation. Eligibility does not guarantee release, and resentencing does not remove accountability for the underlying conduct. Instead, the process allows courts to distinguish people who remain a serious threat from those whose current risk may be manageable through supervision, treatment, and enforceable conditions.
This distinction also helps corrections agencies direct programs where they can have the greatest effect. Intensive services for high-risk individuals, practical support for people facing identifiable barriers, and lower-intensity supervision for low-risk individuals can reduce unnecessary disruption while preserving oversight. Mixing all groups together can be counterproductive, particularly when low-risk people are exposed to more entrenched criminal influences.
Reentry resources and the cost of long sentences
The financial argument for Three Strikes reform is connected to recidivism, not separate from it. A life sentence carries decades of prison, health-care, staffing, and facility costs. If eligible people can be safely resentenced, California may redirect some of those resources toward interventions that prevent new offenses among people who will eventually return to their communities.
Effective reentry begins before release. Planning may include identification documents, medication continuity, housing, employment preparation, family connections, transportation, and referrals to community providers. Supervision agencies also need manageable caseloads and reliable access to treatment. Without those supports, release can become a transition from one unstable environment to another, increasing the chance of relapse or reoffending.
Savings should not be treated as automatic. Courts, probation departments, parole services, treatment providers, and local governments may face new responsibilities when more people receive community-based sentences or resentencing. The public-safety value of reform depends on investing in the capacity to carry out those responsibilities, tracking outcomes, and correcting programs that do not work.
California’s broader criminal justice changes, including county-level responsibility for many formerly state-managed populations, make coordination especially important. State prison policy, county supervision, behavioral-health services, and nonprofit reentry organizations must work from compatible goals. A person’s chances of successful reintegration can be affected by decisions made across all of these systems.
Evaluating whether reform reduces reoffending
A serious evaluation should measure more than the number of people resentenced or the money saved on imprisonment. Policymakers should examine rearrest, reconviction, and return-to-custody rates, while distinguishing technical supervision violations from new serious or violent offenses. They should also study outcomes by age, offense category, prior record, county, and type of service received.
The timing of measurement matters. A short follow-up period may miss later offending, while a long period can obscure which intervention made a difference. Comparisons should account for changes in policing, economic conditions, drug markets, court operations, and access to treatment. Transparent reporting allows the public to judge whether reform is meeting its promise without relying on isolated success stories or alarming individual cases.
Supporters of reform can point to a practical principle: public safety is strongest when punishment and prevention reinforce each other. Severe penalties remain available for people who commit dangerous crimes, while eligible individuals whose third strike was nonviolent may be evaluated for a proportionate sentence. The goal is to reserve permanent or near-permanent incarceration for those who truly require it.
People seeking information about legal developments, court decisions, and implementation can follow the organization’s reform updates. Reliable information is particularly important for families and advocates navigating resentencing, because eligibility rules, filing procedures, and public-safety findings can determine whether a petition receives meaningful review.
Practical priorities for a safer system
A connection between sentencing reform and recidivism reduction becomes meaningful when it guides concrete decisions. California can strengthen that connection by maintaining firm accountability for violence while improving the quality of risk assessment and reentry planning. The following priorities support that balance:
- Reserve life sentences and the most restrictive sanctions for people whose current conduct and history demonstrate a serious, ongoing danger.
- Expand evidence-based substance-use, mental-health, education, and cognitive behavioral programs in custody and after release.
- Give courts complete, current information when reviewing resentencing petitions, including institutional conduct, treatment participation, and validated risk factors.
- Fund county supervision and community providers so release conditions are realistic, monitored, and connected to actual services.
- Publish consistent recidivism and public-safety data, separating new serious offenses from technical violations and other outcomes.
These measures recognize that accountability has several forms. Confinement can protect the public when risk is high. Treatment, supervision, and stable employment can reduce risk when a person is capable of change. A sentencing system that uses both approaches is better positioned to respond to different patterns of offending than one that relies primarily on sentence length.
The public conversation should remain grounded in victims’ safety, lawful process, and measurable results. Reform does not require minimizing the harm caused by crime. It requires asking whether each sentence advances the best available public-safety objective and whether the state is using its resources where they can prevent the greatest number of future offenses.
Learn how California’s Three Strikes reform operates, review current developments, and share accurate information with people affected by the law. Staying engaged with the policy discussion helps preserve the distinction between dangerous violence and nonviolent conduct while supporting a corrections system built around accountability, rehabilitation, and safer communities.