Prop. 36 Will:

  • ELIMINATE unintended and ineffective life sentences currently imposed for nonviolent, non-serious crimes
  • RESTORE the original intent and core purpose of the Three Strikes law: to keep dangerous and violent criminals behind bars.
  • SAVE $100 million per year to fund schools, prevent crime, and decrease the need for tax increases.

For Relief Under Prop. 36:

We are working closely with Public Defender offices and other service providers throughout the state to provide the best possible assistance for anyone eligible for relief under Prop. 36.

Click here for resources.

Why We Won

How Washington Can Encourage Fairer Three Strikes Laws

California’s Three Strikes law was created to impose lengthy prison terms on repeat offenders, especially people convicted of serious or violent crimes. Over time, however, the law also produced life sentences for some defendants whose latest offense was neither serious nor violent. That gap between public-safety goals and sentencing outcomes became central to the campaign for reform.

The federal government does not administer California’s criminal code, and Congress cannot simply rewrite a state sentencing statute. California lawmakers and voters retain primary authority over state crimes, sentencing rules, parole standards, and resentencing procedures. Federal influence is exercised more indirectly through grants, research, court decisions, policy guidance, and national debate.

That influence can still be significant. Washington helps determine which approaches receive funding, which outcomes are measured, and which public-safety strategies are treated as credible. When federal policy rewards targeted prevention and evidence-based corrections, states have stronger reasons to reconsider broad sentencing schemes that consume resources without improving safety.

The limits of federal power over state sentencing

The Constitution’s federal structure gives states broad responsibility for defining and punishing most crimes. California’s Three Strikes framework is therefore a state matter, shaped by the Legislature, the governor, the courts, and voters. A federal agency cannot order Sacramento to adopt Proposition 36-style reforms or direct state judges to shorten a sentence imposed under California law.

Federal courts may still affect the legal environment. Constitutional challenges can examine issues such as due process, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, or the treatment of prior convictions. Yet courts generally give state legislatures wide latitude in setting penalties. A sentence that appears excessively harsh as a matter of policy is not automatically unconstitutional.

The practical result is that federal encouragement works best through lawful incentives rather than commands. Congress can support programs that reduce recidivism, while the Department of Justice can publish research and administer grants. Federal officials can also convene state leaders, prosecutors, corrections administrators, victims’ advocates, and public defenders to compare results. These tools preserve state authority while making effective reform easier to pursue.

Grants can reward public safety over sentence length

Federal criminal-justice grants influence state priorities because they help pay for treatment, reentry services, victim support, data systems, jail improvements, and violence-prevention programs. Programs associated with the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and other agencies can give states resources to address the causes of repeat offending rather than relying exclusively on incarceration.

A grant structure can encourage Three Strikes reform when it recognizes measurable outcomes. Lower rates of violent crime, fewer returns to prison, successful completion of substance-use treatment, stable housing after release, and improved employment are more informative than the number of years imposed at sentencing. States should be able to demonstrate that a targeted sentence combined with supervision and services protects communities more effectively than a life term for a nonviolent triggering offense.

Federal funding must be designed carefully. If grants reward prison expansion, high arrest totals, or long average sentences, they can reinforce the very incentives that reform advocates criticize. Conditions should be transparent, connected to legitimate public-safety objectives, and flexible enough to account for differences among states. Funding should never pressure local officials to weaken penalties for dangerous offenders.

The federal government can also support technical assistance for resentencing systems. California’s reform debate includes questions about who qualifies for relief, how prior convictions are evaluated, how victims are notified, and how courts assess future risk. Better case-management technology and reliable criminal-history records can help judges distinguish between a person who presents a continuing threat and someone who received an extreme sentence for a relatively minor final offense.

Federal research can replace slogans with measurable evidence

National research is especially valuable because Three Strikes debates often rely on dramatic individual cases or broad claims about deterrence. Personal stories reveal the human consequences of sentencing rules, while statistical analysis tests whether those rules reduce crime. Both forms of evidence matter, but they answer different questions and should not be confused.

The National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and federally supported universities can examine how habitual-offender laws affect violence, prison populations, racial disparities, fiscal costs, and repeat offending. Research should track people over time and compare similar groups, including those released under reform and those who remain incarcerated. It should also account for age, offense history, supervision conditions, treatment access, and local crime trends.

Clear public education is part of this work. Readers examining the human cost of California’s sentencing system can see why a final nonviolent offense may produce consequences far beyond what ordinary proportionality would suggest. Federal researchers can add a broader perspective by testing whether extreme sentences produce benefits that justify their financial and social costs.

Federal tool How it can encourage reform Safeguard for public safety
Competitive grants Fund treatment, reentry, supervision, and violence prevention Tie awards to verified outcomes
National research Measure recidivism, deterrence, cost, and disparities Use transparent methods and long-term data
Technical assistance Improve resentencing reviews and risk assessment Preserve judicial review and victim notice
Model guidance Share practices for proportional sentencing Protect state authority and local discretion
Oversight and reporting Identify ineffective or unequal policies Use reliable definitions and independent audits
Federal sentencing changes Demonstrate that targeted penalties can coexist with safety Maintain severe consequences for serious violence

Federal sentencing policy sets a national example

Although federal law does not control California’s sentencing code, federal policy can influence the national conversation. Congress has periodically reconsidered mandatory minimums, sentence enhancements, compassionate release, and prison reentry. The First Step Act, for example, reflected a federal willingness to review some rigid sentencing rules and expand opportunities for rehabilitation, even though it did not eliminate every form of mandatory punishment.

That example matters because states frequently observe federal experiments. A federal government that demands severe penalties in every context sends a different message from one that distinguishes violent conduct from lower-level offenses and supports individualized review. Consistency is important: policymakers should explain why a rule is necessary, whom it protects, and whether less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same objective.

Federal prosecutors and agencies should also avoid presenting incarceration as the sole measure of seriousness. A person convicted of a violent act may require a lengthy sentence to protect the public. A person whose latest offense is nonviolent may require intensive supervision, treatment, and restrictions without receiving an automatic life term. A rational system can make these distinctions without minimizing the harm suffered by victims.

Public discussion benefits from correcting inaccurate claims about reform. A careful data review can help separate predictions from observed results, particularly when evaluating California’s Proposition 36. Federal agencies can reinforce that discipline by publishing accessible methodology, defining terms such as “violent” and “recidivism,” and acknowledging uncertainty where evidence is incomplete.

Oversight should protect victims and taxpayers

Federal encouragement should include oversight of how states implement reforms. Eligibility rules can be written too broadly, or they can be so restrictive that relief exists on paper but is rarely available. Independent evaluations can examine whether resentencing decisions are consistent across counties, whether victims receive timely notice, and whether released individuals receive meaningful supervision and services.

Fiscal analysis is another essential component. Long prison terms require decades of housing, health care, and security expenses. Those costs compete with funding for police departments, emergency services, schools, behavioral-health programs, and victim assistance. Federal analysts can help states calculate the lifetime cost of incarceration and compare it with the cost of treatment, electronic monitoring, probation, and reentry support.

Oversight must avoid treating every person eligible for reform as equally low risk. A sound review process should consider the full record, the nature of prior offenses, conduct in prison, age, rehabilitation, and plans for release. It should allow prosecutors and victims to present relevant information, while giving the individual a genuine opportunity to demonstrate why a reduced sentence is appropriate.

The federal government can encourage common standards without replacing state judgment. Reporting requirements might ask states to publish eligibility numbers, resentencing outcomes, rearrest rates, and new violent offenses. Independent auditors could assess whether results differ by race, geography, or access to counsel. These safeguards make reform more credible and reveal where implementation needs correction.

A balanced approach keeps dangerous offenders in focus

The strongest argument for reform is not that every long sentence is unjustified. It is that punishment should track the seriousness of the current conduct and the actual risk posed by the individual. Severe penalties remain appropriate for people who commit violent crimes or present a demonstrated danger. The policy question is whether a nonviolent offense should automatically trigger a life sentence because of an older record.

This distinction also answers a common concern that reform will create automatic release. Carefully designed legislation can preserve judicial discretion, require a hearing, consider victims’ interests, and permit continued incarceration when evidence shows a serious threat. Federal guidance should emphasize these safeguards rather than endorse a single formula for every state.

Age is relevant as well. Many people who receive lengthy sentences are eventually incarcerated into old age, when the likelihood of committing a violent offense generally declines. That does not erase the harm of past crimes, but it can affect the public-safety value of continued confinement. Federal research can help states assess risk in a way that reflects current behavior rather than relying only on historical labels.

The federal role is therefore best understood as a catalyst. Washington can make reliable evidence available, finance practical alternatives, and reward states that reduce crime while limiting unnecessary incarceration. California must decide the final shape of its sentencing law, but federal policy can help create conditions in which proportional reform is politically and administratively achievable.

Priorities for responsible federal encouragement

Federal officials, state policymakers, and advocacy organizations can focus on several practical principles:

  • Fund treatment, reentry, and violence-prevention programs alongside correctional institutions.
  • Require transparent reporting on resentencing, recidivism, victim participation, and fiscal effects.
  • Support independent research that distinguishes violent offending from nonviolent triggering conduct.
  • Protect judicial review, due process, public notice, and meaningful input from victims.
  • Preserve strong penalties for serious and dangerous crimes while ending automatic life sentences for eligible nonviolent offenses.

These priorities connect reform to public safety rather than framing the issue as a choice between compassion and accountability. They also give the public concrete standards for judging whether a policy works. If crime remains low, released individuals comply with supervision, and resources reach high-risk communities, reform gains an evidence-based foundation.

Advocacy groups have an important role in translating technical findings into public understanding. The Committee for Three Strikes Reform offers reform resources for people following California’s debate, including arguments about fairness, safety, cost, and available relief. Clear information helps families, journalists, officials, and voters evaluate proposals on their actual terms.

Federal encouragement will be most effective when it respects California’s authority while insisting on honest measurement and responsible implementation. Visit the Committee for Three Strikes Reform to review the evidence, understand the case for proportional sentencing, and support reforms that reserve the harshest penalties for conduct that truly warrants them.

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